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Standing to Contest Administrative Action 
Under the Land Withdrawal and Review Program: 
Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation/ the Supreme Court 
determined, in a five-to-four decision, that a private organization lacked 
standing to contest a proposed withdrawal of land. This note contends 
that the Supreme Court's decision to affirm the district court's grant of 
summary judgment, a common Supreme Court practice,2 was not an 
efficient use of judicial resources.3 Despite evidence supporting stand-
ing, the Court opted to decide the matter primarily on a procedural 
basis and thereby precluded a substantive analysis of the law in this 
sensitive area. 
Part II of this note briefly summarizes the statutes and federal 
court decisions that provide the background for Lujan. Part III in-
troduces the facts of Lujan. Part IV sets forth the Court's reasoning on 
the summary judgment issue. Part V analyzes the Lujan decision, 
I. 110 S. Ct. 3177 (1990). It is helpful at this point to indicate that Lujan v. National 
Wildlife Federation, the case before the Supreme Court, is cited as National Wildlife Federation 
v. Burford in the lower federal courts. In this note, therefore, references to Lujan and Burford 
are to this same case at different stages of litigation. 
2. The notion of judicial restraint is often invoked by the Court to summarily dismiss cases; 
the Court occasionally relies upon notions of prudence and avoids "political questions" to abstain 
from deciding cases on their merits. See, e.g., Rescue Army v. Municipal Court of Los Angeles, 
331 U.S. 549 (1947); Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288 (1936). 
3. The district court's summary disposition was somewhat surprising since the case had been 
through protracted litigation in the lower federal courts. In National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 
676 F. Supp. 271 (D.D.C. 1985), the district court originally granted the respondents a prelimi-
nary injunction and found they had standing to contest the withdrawal of the federal land. The 
D.C. Circuit subsequently affirmed the district court decision and remanded the case to the district 
court in National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 835 F.2d 305 (D.C. Cir. 1987). On remand, the 
district court dissolved the preliminary injunction and granted petitioner's motion for summary 
judgment, finding that respondents lacked standing to contest the withdrawal order. National 
Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 699 F. Supp. 327 (D.D.C. 1988). The D.C. Circuit, however, reversed 
the district court and held that respondents did have adequate standing in the controversy. Na-
tional Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 878 F.2d 422 (D.C. Cir. 1989). Subsequent to this decision of 
the D.C. Circuit, the Supreme Court granted certiorari. National Wildlife Fed'n v. Lujan, 110 S. 
Ct. 834 (1990). The Supreme Court then reversed the decision of the D.C. Circuit finding that the 
National Wildlife Federation lacked standing. Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 110 S. Ct. 3177 
(1990). Subsequently the Court vacated its decision in Lujan, stating "[t]he judgment is vacated 
and the case is remanded to the [D.C. Circuit] ... for further consideration in light of Lujan v. 
National Wildlife Fed'n, 110 S. Ct. 3177 (1990)." Mountain States Legal Found. v. National 
Wildlife Fed'n, 110 S. Ct. 3265 (1990). 
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stressing that the Lujan court missed an opportunity to solidify princi-
ples in this area of the law, and proffers a possible solution for actions 
similar to Lujan in the future. This note concludes that Lujan pro-
vided an occasion to review the program of public land withdrawal and 
that the Court should not have limited itself solely to the standing issue 
in deciding the case. 
II. BACKGROUND 
The Administrative Procedure Act of 1966 (APA)4 allows the 
Court to review federal agency actions. The APA requires that a party 
establish standing in order to invoke judicial review. 5 A party estab-
lishes standing by demonstrating that first, they have been affected by 
some "agency action," and second, they have been "adversely affected 
or aggrieved" by the agency action.6 
A number of cases illustrate how standing is obtained on an indi-
vidual or organizational basis. 7 The Court in Hunt v. Washington 
State Apple Advertising Commission,8 recognized that an organization 
can establish "representational standing"9 when "( 1) . . . its members 
would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; (2) the inter-
ests it seeks to protect are germane to the organization's purpose; and 
(3) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the par-
ticipation of individual members in the lawsuit."10 In Sierra Club v. 
Morton/ 1 a case preceding Hunt, the Court provided additional guid-
ance for obtaining representational standing when it stated that "the 
'injury in fact' test requires more than an injury to a cognizable inter-
est. It requires that the party seeking review be himself among the 
injured."12 
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in National 
Wildlife Federation v. Burford13 further described the type of injury 
4. Ch. 423, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706 
(1988)). 
5. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1988). 
6. /d. 
7. See, e.g., International Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Work-
ers of Am. v. Brock, 477 U.S. 274 (1986); Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 
432 U.S. 333 (1977); United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures 
(SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669 (1973). 
8. 432 u.s. 333 (1977). 
9. Representational standing is the ability granted an organization to represent either itself or 
its members in a judicial proceeding. See id. at 342-43. 
10. /d. at 343. 
11. 405 U.S. 727 (1972). 
12. /d. at 734-35 (emphasis added). 
13. 835 F.2d 305 (D.C. Cir. 1987), modified, 699 F. Supp. 327 (D.D.C. 1988), rev'd, 878 
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necessary to provide standing and invoke judicial review. The court 
stated that "(the party asserting standing] must allege facts demonstrat-
ing a definable and discernible injury to its members and an adequate 
connection between that injury and the members." 1' In environmental 
lawsuits, the injury requirement is particularly relevant since there ex-
ists the potential for involving numerous individuals and vast areas of 
land. 111 The Court provided guidance in examining the injury require-
ment in Sierra/6 as intimated earlier/7 and in United States v. Stu-
dents Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP). 18 
In Sierra, an environmental organization contested a government 
decision to permit the development of a "quasi-wilderness" national 
park by private developers. 19 The Sierra Club alleged that the private 
development of public lands would be injurious to the interests it was 
designed to protect, namely "the conservation and the sound mainte-
nance of the national parks, game refuges and forests of the country 
•... "
20 The Sierra Club stated that the development "would destroy 
or otherwise adversely affect the scenery, natural and historic objects 
and wildlife of the park and would impair the enjoyment of the park 
for future generations."21 Although the Court recognized the alleged 
injury as a "cognizable injury," the Supreme Court denied standing 
and declared that "(t]he Sierra Club failed to allege that it or its mem-
bers would be affected in any of their activities or pastimes by the . . . 
development."22 From Sierra, therefore, it appears that a party must 
allege injury to all or specific members of an organization to ensure 
standing.23 A mere allegation of a public injury, therefore, is not suffi-
cient to establish standing. 2' 
The Sierra limitation for group standing proved to be minor,211 
since the Court in SCRAP recognized group standing to contest an 
agency decision.26 In SCRAP, a student organization sought to contest a 
F.2d 422 (D.C. Cir. 1989), rev'd sub nom. Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 110 S. Ct. 3177 
(1990), vacated sub nom. Mountain States Legal Found. v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 110 S. Ct. 
3265 ( 1990). 
14. /d. at 311 (citation omitted). 
15. See id. at 311-15. 
16. Sierra v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972). 
17. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
18. 412 U.S. 669 (1973). 
19. Sierra, 405 U.S. at 728-30. 
20. /d. at 730. 
21. /d. at 734. 
22. /d. at 735. 
23. See id. at 734-35. 
24. /d. 
25. G. GUNTHER, CoNSTITUTIONAL LAw 1549 n.4 (lith ed. 1985). 
26. See United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 
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federal agency rate increase. The plaintiffs alleged injury in fact result-
ing from the agency decision.27 The group also alleged that the rate 
increase would impair their use of the "air" and "the forests, rivers, 
streams, mountains and other natural resources" in the Washington 
area.28 The plaintiffs, undoubtedly in response to the Court's Sierra 
decision, alleged that they actually used "the forest, rivers, streams, 
mountains and other resources surrounding the Washington Metropoli-
tan area."29 The plaintiffs also claimed that the agency decision would 
disrupt their recreational and aesthetic enjoyment of the region. 30 
The D.C. Circuit in Burford relied upon the SCRAP analysis to 
affirm the district court's decision. 31 The D.C. Circuit concluded that 
the National Wildlife Federation (NWF) had satisfied the standing re-
quirement as prescribed by SCRAP and other cases.32 Although the 
Court in Lujan ultimately determined that the NWF did not have ade-
quate standing to contest the agency action, the cases just cited support 
the NWF's position that the organization or its members were affected 
by an "agency action" and that their allegations were sufficient to over-
come a motion for summary judgment in the matter. 33 Because the 
NWF demonstrated the requisite injury, it appears that the D.C. Cir-
cuit in Burford properly granted standing and review under the APA. 
III. FACTS 
In Lujan, the NWF argued that the D.C. Circuit's decision 
(which reversed the district court's decision granting summary judg-
ment and found that the NWF did in fact have standing to contest the 
agency action) should be affirmed. 34 The primary concern before both 
the appellate and district courts was the standing of a private organiza-
U.S. 669 (1973). 
27. /d. at 678. 
28. /d. (quoting SCRAP's amended complaint). 
29. !d. 
30. /d. 
31. National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 835 F.2d 305 (D.C. Cir. 1987), modified, 699 F. 
Supp. 327 (D.D.C. 1988), 1·ev'd, 878 F.2d 422 (D.C. Cir. 1989), rev'd sub nom. Lujan v. Na-
tional Wildlife Fed'n, 110 S. Ct. 3177 (1990), vacated sub nom. Mountain States Found. v. 
National Wildlife Fed'n, 110 S. Ct. 3265 (1990). See supra notes 1, 3. 
32. Burford, 835 F.2d at 311-17. The D.C. Circuit stated the synthesized rule to be: "[I]n 
order to establish injury in fact for representational standing, an organization must allege facts 
showing that one or more of its members is among the persons injured by the challenged agency 
action." /d. at 311. 
33. See supra notes 18-29 and accompanying text; see also Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 
727 (1972); United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 
U.S. 669 (1973). 
34. For an explanation of the procedural posture of the case, see supra note 3 and accompa-
nying text. 
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tion to contest a federal agency action. The NWF alleged that the Bu-
reau of Land Management (BLM) had violated public and private in-
terests811 as established by the Federal ~and Policy and Management 
Act of 197 6 (FLPMA)36 and by the National Environmental Policy 
Act of 1969 (NEPA).37 Accordingly, the NWF sought judicial review 
and an injunction against the BLM's "land withdrawal and review 
program."38 
The federal district court initially held that the NWF had stand-
ing in the matter and granted its motion for a preliminary injunction.88 
The D.C. Circuit affirmed,40 stating that "we conclude that the federa-
tion has alleged facts that demonstrate that the actions of the Depart-
ment threaten to harm the cognizable interests of the Federation's 
members. Consequently, we find that the Federation has alleged injury 
in fact sufficient to establish standing to pursue its . . . claims against 
the Department."41 The D.C. Circuit also agreed with the district 
court's conclusion that a preliminary injunction should issue.'2 Finally, 
the D.C. Circuit issued a further order both reiterating the sensitive 
nature of the action and mandating that the district court hold a ple-
nary hearing on the matter.43 
35. See infra notes 53-58 and accompanying text. The public violations involved were alleged 
to be actions taken under the "land withdrawal and review program" which were in violation of 
the expressly stated purposes of the Federal Land Policy and Management Act (FLPMA) and the 
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) (e.g., to "provide for outdoor recreation and human 
occupancy and use [of public lands]." 43 U.S.C. § 1701 (a)(8) (1988)). The private violations, as 
supported by National Wildlife Federation (NWF) member affidavits, revolved around allegations 
of interference with the recreational use and aesthetic enjoyment of the public lands by private 
citizens. See Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 110 S. Ct. 3177 (1990). 
36. Pub. L. No. 94-579, 90 Stat. 2743 (1973) (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. § 1701 
(1988)). 
37. Pub. L. No. 91-190, § 102, 83 Stat. 852, 853-54 (1970) (codified as amended at 42 
U.S.C. § 4321 (1988)). 
38. National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 676 F. Supp. 271, 273 (D.D.C. 1985), modified, 
676 F. Supp. 280 (D.D.C. 1986), affd, 835 F.2d 305 (D.C. Cir. 1987), modified, 699 F. Supp. 
327 (D.D.C. 1988), rev'd, 878 F.2d 422 (D.C. Cir. 1989), rev'd sub nom. Lujan v. National 
Wildlife Fed'n, 110 S. Ct. 3177 (1990), vacated sub nom. Mountain States Found. v. National 
Wildlife Fed'n, 110 S. Ct. 3265 (1990). The BLM's land withdrawal review program permits the 
BLM to remove land from the reserve of public lands and allows private parties to occupy and use 
the land for such activities as mining, forestation, and other private ventures. 
39. See id. at 273. 
40. Burford, 835 F.2d at 327. 
41. !d. at 314. 
42. /d. at 319. In determining that the preliminary injunction should issue, both the D.C. 
Circuit and the district court analyzed the following four factors: "(I) the plaintiffs likelihood of 
success on the merits; (2) the threat of irreparable injury to the plaintiff absent the injunction; (3) 
the possibility of substantial harm to other parties caused by issuance of the injunction; and (4) the 
public interest." /d. at 318-19. 
43. National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 844 F.2d 889 (D.C. Cir. 1988). The court stated 
that "this is a serious case with serious implications." !d. at 889 (quoting Burford, 835 F.2d at 
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At the plenary hearing, the district court granted the defendant's 
motion for summary judgment, concluding that the plaintiffs did not 
have proper "standing" to contest the agency action.44 This decision 
prevented a complete review of the alleged violations resulting from the 
withdrawal of public lands. What followed in the D.C. Circuit and the 
Supreme Court was simply a review of the basis for summary judg-
ment, the discretionary actions taken by the district court, and the in-
definite standing requirements. The substantive question of whether 
there was agency action in violation of prescribed federal policy was 
limited by summarily deciding the case. 
IV. REASONING 
In Lujan, the Supreme Court reversed the D.C. Circuit's decision 
and concluded that the district court correctly granted summary judg-
ment in National Wildlife Federation v. Burford."6 The Court held 
that the NWF did not establish standing for the action, determining 
that it proved neither the requisite injury nor that its member(s) had 
been "adversely effected."46 The Court also concluded that the district 
court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to consider additional affi-
davits submitted by the NWF.47 
The Court's rationale for affirming the district court's decision 
rested upon its application of Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
327). In the final paragraph of the decision, the D.C. Circuit stated: 
While this case continues to pend in our court, the district court has not gone forward 
with plenary consideration of the merits. The court here denies the petitions for rehear-
ing and issues its mandate forthwith with directions to the parties and the district court 
to proceed with this litigation with dispatch. 
Burford, 844 F.2d at 890. 
44. National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 699 F. Supp. 327 (D.D.C. 1988), rev'd, 878 F.2d 
422 (D.C. Cir. 1989), rev'd sub nom. Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 110 S. Ct. 3177 (1990), 
vacated sub nom. Mountain States Found. v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 110 S. Ct. 3265 (1990). 
45. See Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 110 S. Ct. 3177 (1990). The relevant district court 
decision granting the motion for summary judgment against the NWF was National Wildlife 
Fed'n v. Burford, 699 F. Supp. 327 (D.D.C. 1988). 
46. See Lujan, 110 S. Ct. at 3185-86. 
47. See id. at 3191-93. The arridavits riled with the district court originally consisted of the 
"Peterson" and "Erman" affidavits. These affidavits, submitted by two members of the NWF, 
went to the standing requirement that either the organization or its members suffered an injury in 
fact as required by the Sierra and SCRAP decisions. See supra notes 19-30 and accompanying 
text. The district court ultimately determined that the NWF had failed to satisfy the standing 
requirement, finding that the "Peterson" and "Erman" affidavits were "vague, conclusory and 
lack[ed] factual specificity." Burford, 699 F. Supp. at 332. The NWF, to satisfy the standing 
requirement, attempted to submit four additional member affidavits alleging more specific injury 
due to the federal agency action. See Lujan, 110 S. Ct. at 3189-93. The Court determined that the 
district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to consider the additional affidavits, finding 
them to be untimely under Rule 6(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. /d. at 3191-93. 
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Procedure. 48 In applying the rule, the Court notably relied upon the 
now seminal case Celotex Corp. v. Catrett. 49 In Lujan, the Court 
quoted Celotex which pronounced: 
[T]he plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary 
judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against 
a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the exis-
tence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that 
party will bear the burden of proof at trial.G0 
The party seeking review under section 702 of the APA bears the bur-
den to "set forth specific facts . . . showing that he has satisfied its 
terms."111 Essentially, the Court concluded that the two members' affi-
davits did not give rise to a genuine factual dispute. 112 
The NWF, to satisfy the injury requirement of the APA and as 
compelled under the Sierra and SCRAP decisions, submitted affidavits 
from two of its members,113 Peggy Peterson and Richard Erman.114 
These affidavits alleged interference with Peterson's and Erman's rec-
reational use and aesthetic enjoyment of certain public lands which 
were withdrawn under the BLM's land withdrawal review program.1111 
48. This procedural rule states that a party is entitled to summary judgment in his favor "if 
the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving 
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. C1v. P. 56( c) (emphasis added). 
49. 477 U.S. 317 (1986). This case dealt with a wrongful death action wherein the respon-
dent alleged that her husband's death was the result of exposure to asbestos products manufac-
tured or delivered by the fifteen defendant corporations named in the action. ld. at 319. The 
district court granted summary judgment to the petitioners since the respondents were unable to 
produce evidence to support the wrongful death allegation before the court. ld. The evidence 
produced by the respondent in opposition to the motion for summary judgment consisted of three 
documents. ld. at 320. The three documents were challenged by the petitioners as hearsay and 
were not admitted at trial. ld. Petitioners concluded that since the evidence submitted by the 
respondents was inadmissible, the court should not be precluded from entering summary judg-
ment. ld. The Supreme Court in deciding the case solidified its procedure of sustaining a motion 
for summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and clarified the 
ambiguity resulting from the decision in Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970), which 
states: 
Under Rule 56(c), summary judgment is proper 'if the pleadings, depositions, answers 
to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that 
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to 
a judgment as a matter of law . . . . ' 
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)). 
50. Lujan, 110 S. Ct. at 3186 (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,322 (1986)) 
(emphasis added). 
51. Lujan, 110 S. Ct. at 3187 (quoting Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 740 (1972)). 
52. See Lujan, 110 S. Ct. at 3187-89. 
53. See Burford, 699 F. Supp. at 331. 
54. ld.; see also supra note 47. 
55. These were the original affidavits that the NWF submitted alleging interference of the 
two respective NWF members' use of public lands. See supra note 47. 
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Based upon this alleged interference, the NWF sought to contest the 
BLM's land withdrawal review program as it related to FLPMA and 
NEPA. 116 The NWF tried to obtain judicial review of the federal pro-
gram pursuant to the APA. 117 The Court determined, however, that the 
NWF failed to show that the land withdrawal review program was a 
final agency action and that its members had been "adversely affected 
or aggrieved."118 
The Court emphasized that under the APA, there exists no right 
to a private cause of action. 119 A party is required, therefore, to provide 
evidence of an agency action which is final in nature and which demon-
strates the party has "suffered a legal wrong" in order to obtain judi-
cial review.60 The Court failed to find a final agency action in Lujan, 
since the land withdrawal and review program did not constitute a sin-
gle administrative act but referred to a general scheme.61 Additionally, 
the Court concluded that the general statements contained in the Peter-
son and Erman affidavits did not constitute a sufficient aggrievement to 
justify judicial review.62 The Court concluded its determination on 
standing by citing Sierra, which states that "[t]he burden is on the 
party seeking review under section 702 to set forth specific facts (even 
though they may be controverted by the Government) showing that he 
has satisfied its terms."63 
The NWF attempted to present four additional affidavits in order 
to overcome the alleged evidentiary insufficiencies.64 The district court, 
however, refused to consider the supplemental affidavits.611 The NWF 
56. The relevant interference is found within the statutes. For example, the purpose of the 
FLPMA is to insure that 
the public lands be managed in a manner that will protect the quality of scientific, 
scenic, historical, ecological, environmental, air and atmospheric, water resource, and 
archeological values; that, where appropriate, will preserve and protect certain public 
lands in their natural condition; ... and that will provide for outdoor recreation 
and human occupancy and use . . . . 
43 U.S.C. § 1701(a)(8) (1988) (emphasis added). 
57. 5 u.s.c. § 706 (1988). 
58. Lujan, 110 S. Ct. at 3185-86. 
59. Id. at 3185. 
60. Id. at 3185-86. 
61. See id. (citing 5 U.S.C. § 704 (1988)). Section 704 reads: "Agency action made review-
able by statute and final agency action for which there is not other adequate remedy in a court are 
subject to judicial review." Id. (emphasis added). 
62. Lujan, 110 S. Ct. at 3187-89. This conclusion was reached primarily due to the vast 
amount of land included in the withdrawal area and the failure on the part of the affidavits to 
identify a specific area harmed. See id. at 3188. 
63. Lujan, 110 S. Ct. at 3186-87 (quoting Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 740 
(1972)). 
64. Lujan, 110 S. Ct. at 3189. 
65. ld. at 3191-92. 
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contended that the district court erred in refusing to consider this addi-
tional evidence. These additional affidavits, however, were not submit-
ted within the prescribed time limit. Admission of tardy evidence is 
governed by Rule 6(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which 
provides: 
When by these rules or by a notice given thereunder or by order of 
court an act is required or allowed to be done at or within a specified 
time, the court for cause shown may at .any time in its discretion (1) 
with or without motion or notice order the period enlarged if request 
therefore is made before the expiration of the period originally pre-
scribed or as extended by a previous order, or (2) upon motion made 
after the expiration of the specified period permit the act to be done 
where the failure to act was the result of excusable neglect .... 66 
The Court recognized that under Rule 6(b) the acceptance of ad-
ditional evidence fell completely within the discretion of the district 
court.67 But as a preliminary matter to invoking Rule 6(b), NWF had 
to meet the requirements of the rule, which it had not done.68 There-
fore, the Supreme Court concluded that the district court acted within 
its discretion when it precluded the admission of the four subsequent 
affidavits.89 The affirmation in this manner of the district court deci-
sion on a purely procedural basis allowed the Court to avoid discussing 
the politically sensitive issue of public land withdrawai.1° 
V. ANALYSIS 
A. The Requisite Elements That Constitute "Standing" to Contest 
an Administrative Agency Ruling 
The pertinent statute for relief from a federal administrative ac-
tion is the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).71 To establish stand-
ing, the APA requires that an aggrieved party show that it has been 
affected by some "agency action."72 In addition, the party must prove 
that it has been "adversely affected or aggrieved" by the administrative 
66. FED. R. CJV. P. 6(b). 
67. Lujan, 110 S. Ct. at 3192. 
68. /d. The factors enumerated in order to invoke the Rule 6(b) discretion are: "First, any 
extension of a time limitation must be 'for cause shown[,]' [and] [s]econd, ... any post-deadline 
extension must be 'upon motion made.'" /d. 
69. /d. 
70. See supra note 2. 
71. See 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1988). 
72. Id. "Agency action" is defined to constitute the following: " '[A]gency action' includes the 
whole or a part of an agency rule, order, license, sanction, relief, or the equivalent or denial 
thereof, or failure to act .... " 5 U.S.C. § 551(13) (1988). 
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action "within the meaning of a relevant statute."73 This requires a 
showing that the injury complained of falls within the "zone of inter-
ests" sought to be protected by FLPMA and NEPA.74 
Moreover, neither the FLPMA nor the NEPA provides for a pri-
vate right of action. 711 Rather, relief from a "final agency action" is 
required in order for a party to obtain redress. 76 It was therefore essen-
tial that the NWF, in the evidence submitted to the court, illustrate 
that a final administrative action had had an adverse effect. 
The final area of contention accompanying the contest of an ad-
ministrative action is the degree of specificity with which a party must 
allege and prove an injury suffered in order to prevent the courts from 
summarily disposing of a case.77 It is in this area that the Court could 
have provided additional insight to solidify this genre of federal 
litigation. 
1. Federal agency action which affects parties 
The Court in Lujan articulated the requirement of demonstrating 
"agency action" as follows: "[T]he [party] claiming a right to sue must 
identify some 'agency action' that affects him in the specified fashion 
••.. "
78 The specified fashion under section 702 of the APA is defined 
as "the whole or a part of an agency rule, order, license, sanction, re-
lief, or the equivalent or the denial thereof, or failure to act."79 
The Court in Lujan did assert that the land withdrawal program 
was not a specified type of agency action under section 702 and there-
fore not a "final agency action."80 The particular agency action was the 
withdrawal under the BLM land withdrawal program of 180 million 
acres of public land. There is a marked disagreement between the Su-
preme Court Justices whether action taken under the BLM land with-
73. Lujan, 110 S. Ct. at 3185 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 702). 
74. Lujan, 110 S Ct. at 3186. For a listing of the interests or purposes of the FLPMA, see 
supra note 56. 
75. See Lujan, 110 S. Ct. at 3185. 
76. /d. 
77. See Burford, 835 F.2d at 311-15. The D.C. Circuit stated with precision the holdings 
from the seminal cases in this area-Sierra and SCRAP. However, the tendency of various courts 
to vacilate in applying the principles of Sierra and SCRAP was also apparent. The primary 
difficulty appeared to be in determining the degree of specificity required in alleging and submit-
ting evidence of injury due to the agency action, with Sierra precluding general allegations of 
injury suffered and SCRAP illustrating a successful case for supporting an allegation of injury in 
order to have the case decided on the merits. /d. 
78. See Lujan, 110 S. Ct. at 3185. 
79. 5 U.S.C. § 551(13) (1988). 
80. See Lujan, 110 S. Ct. at 3189. The "final agency action" distinction is relevant since no 
private right of action exists under § 702, only review for "final agency actions." /d. 
217] LUJAN v. NATIONAL WILDLIFE FEDERATION 227 
drawal program constitutes a "final agency action."81 Arguably, how-
ever, the first requirement of identifying an agency action under the 
BLM land withdrawal program is satisfied and would entitle the 
NWF to judicial review. 
The standing requirements for an individual or an organization, 
although essentially the same, can be different. The purpose behind the 
standing requirement is to ensure that the party before the court has a 
sufficient stake in the outcome of a controversy to justify that party's 
litigation of the claim.82 The general standing requirements for both 
individuals and organizations for standing are: First, the party seeking 
standing must have suffered, or is likely to suffer, some type of injury 
in fact; second, the harm suffered or likely to be suffered must be indi-
vidual and not an injury which is general, or one which a large group 
of others is also likely to suffer from; and finally, the action being chal-
lenged must be the cause in fact of the injury (i.e., the injury is not only 
the actual cause of the injury but also the relief being sought must be 
likely to redress the injury).83 The "injury in fact" requirement, how-
ever, takes on added importance for a party seeking representational 
standing. 84 
The ability of an organization to obtain representational standing 
for its members in a federal administrative agency action is well estab-
lished.8G The Court in Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising 
Commission86 established this principle and delineated the method by 
which an organization could obtain representational standing for its 
members. Representational standing is permitted when: "(1) one or 
more of the organization's members would otherwise have standing to 
sue in their own right; (2) the interests the organization seeks to protect 
are germane to the organization's purposes; and (3) neither the claim 
asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual 
81. See Lujan, 110 S. Ct. at 3189-90 n.2 (Scalia, J., contending that the land withdrawal 
program is not a final agency action). But see Lujan, 110 S. Ct. at 3201-02 (Blackmun, J., 
dissenting) (arguing that land withdrawal under the control of the BLM does in fact constitute a 
"program" that would qualify as a final agency action under the APA). 
82. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CoNSTITUTIONAL LAw § I 1-2, at 107 (2d ed. 1 988). 
83. See, e.g., Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59 (1978); Schles-
inger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974) (the Schlesinger case is particu-
larly important because the Court determined that it was not willing to recognize standing for 
harms suffered to citizens in general). 
84. See United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 
U.S. 669 (1973); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972). 
85. See, e.g., International Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agricultural Implement 
Workers of Am. v. Brock, 477 U.S. 274 (1986); Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising 
Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977). 
86. 432 u.s. 333 (1977). 
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members in the lawsuit."87 
In Lujan and the litigation preceding it, the courts have recog-
nized that organizations are capable of obtaining representational 
standing.88 The petitioners, however, contested whether the NWF and 
its members satisfied the Hunt requirements.89 In particular, the peti-
tioners argued against representational standing because the NWF 
failed to show that "each of its members ha[d] standing."90 The peti-
tioners asserted that the members of the NWF would not have individ-
ual standing due to their failure to properly allege the requisite injury 
in fact. 91 The assertion that each member must show injury in fact is 
incorrect; the D.C. Circuit correctly pointed out that "the [NWF] need 
only demonstrate that 'one or more' of its members would have stand-
ing to challenge the [BLM's] actions."92 
2. The party must prove that it has been "adversely affected or 
aggrieved" 
The Court in Lujan gave a concise explanation of what constitutes 
evidence sufficient to demonstrate that a party has been "adversely af-
fected or aggrieved. "93 The Court stated that "the [party] must estab-
lish that the injury he complains of [(his aggrievement, or the adverse 
effect upon him)] falls within the 'zone of interests' sought to be pro-
tected by the statutory provision whose violation forms the legal basis 
for his complaint."94 Therefore, the inquiry germane to determining 
whether or not a party has been "adversely affected" by an agency rul-
ing is "what zones of interests does the statute in question protect. " 911 
The relevant statutes for determining the zones of interests in Lu-
jan were FLPMA96 and NEPA.97 The express language of these stat-
utes illustrates that the respondents' contentions were within the zones 
of interests. The impairment to the respondents' recreational use and 
aesthetic enjoyment indicates that they had been "adversely affected" by 
the agency action.98 FLPMA contains the following "zone of interest" 
87. /d. at 343. 
88. See supra note 3. 
89. See Lujan, 110 S. Ct. at 3189-91. 
90. Burford, 835 F.2d at 314. 
91. /d. at 311. 
92. /d. at 314 (citations omitted). 
93. See Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 110 S. Ct. 3177, 3186 (1990). 
94. Id. at 3186 (citing Clarke v. Securities Indus. Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388, 396-97 (1987)) (em-
phasis in original). 
95. Lujan, 110 S. Ct. at 3186. 
96. 43 u.s.c. § 1701 (1988). 
97. NEPA, § 102, 42 U.S.C. 4321 (1988). 
98. See supra note 56 and accompanying text. FLPMA and NEPA expressly state that they 
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language: "[to) provide for outdoor recreation and human occupancy 
and use . "99 
Based upon the express language of the applicable statutes, there-
fore, it appears clear that the respondents in Lujan were adversely af-
fected. Nevertheless, the Court determined that the NWF did not have 
adequate standing to contest the federal agency action. In so doing, the 
Court decided that the respondents had failed to demonstrate the requi-
site specificity of injury to its members to guarantee standing.100 
3. The degree of specificity required to allege and prove an injury 
After Lujan, the degree of specificity with which a potential plain-
tiff must allege injury in order to establish standing in an agency action 
is unclear. The D.C. Circuit in Burford outlined the development of 
the "specificity requirement" prior to Lujan. 101 The degree of specific-
ity had previously evolved under Sierra102 and SCRAP.103 Based upon 
Sierra, the D.C. Circuit noted that "the Federation [NWF) must 
demonstrate that 'the challenged action ha[d] caused [its members) in-
jury in fact.' " 104 The application of the injury in fact rule was further 
refined under SCRAP, where the D.C. Circuit stated that "[t)he Feder-
ation must allege facts demonstrating a definable and discernible injury 
to its members and an adequate connection between that injury and the 
members.'' 1011 The Court in Lujan never expressed its understanding of 
what constitutes the desired degree of specificity. 
a. Requisite injury sufficient to establish standing. The require-
ment that a plaintiff allege actual injury in order to establish standing 
creates confusion in Lujan. This requirement dictates that the action 
being challenged must be the cause in fact of the injury.106 In addition, 
the relief sought in the action must be likely to redress the injury suf-
fered.107 It is apparent that in Lujan the respondent's alleged in-
jury-the loss of aesthetic enjoyment and recreational use-was the re-
sult of agency action under the land withdrawal and review program. 
are to protect the applicable federal land to encourage and preserve the land for aesthetic enjoy-
ment and recreational use. 
99. 43 U.S.C. § 1701(a)(8) (1988). 
100. See Lujan, 110 S. Ct. at 3187-89; see also supra notes 90-92 and accompanying text. 
101. Burford, 835 F.2d at 311-15. 
102. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972). 
103. United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 
U.S. 669 (1973). 
104. Burford, 835 F.2d at 311 (quoting Sierra, 405 U.S. at 733). 
105. Burford, 835 F.2d at 311 (citing SCRAP, 412 U.S. at 688-89). For an enumeration of 
the general standing requirements, see supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text. 
I 06. See supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text. 
107. ld. 
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The difficulty in the Court's analysis, however, rests primarily with the 
remedy sought and the vast implications resulting if the respondents 
would have prevailed.108 
In Lujan, the vast public land potentially affected and the sensitiv-
ity of the questions at issue probably influenced the district court and 
the Supreme Court to summarily dispose of the NWF's claim. The 
courts disposed of the action by applying Rule 56(c), concluding that 
the evidence submitted by the respondent was vague and did not meet 
the Sierra and SCRAP specificity requirements. 109 To determine 
whether the evidentiary requirement was met according to precedent, it 
is important to recognize that the degree of specificity is different de-
pending upon the stage of litigation. 110 
b. Specificity required to establish injury. In Sierra, the Court de-
nied representational standing for an organization where the alleged 
injury was a generalized public injury. 111 SCRAP seemed to extend 
standing to organizations capable of alleging specific injury to either the 
organization itself or its membersP2 However, the Court in SCRAP 
qualified this broad holding by stating that 
[a] plaintiff must allege that he has been or will in fact be perceptibly 
harmed by the challenged agency action, not that he can imagine cir-
cumstances in which he could be affected by the agency's action. And 
it is equally clear that the allegations must be true and capable of 
proof at trial. 113 
Also implicit in the Court's holding is the view that the degree of 
specificity with which a plaintiff must allege injury may vary, depend-
ing upon the procedural posture of the case. 114 SCRAP indicates that 
greater specificity in alleging an injury is required in order for a party 
to overcome a motion for summary judgment. Unfortunately, in Lujan, 
108. For example, the preliminary injunction granted originally by the district court in Na-
tional Wildlife Federation v. Burford, 676 F. Supp. 271 (1985), had the effect of freezing the 
status of approximately 180 million acres of public land. 
109. See National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 699 F. Supp. 327 (D.D.C. 1988); Lujan v. 
National Wildlife Fed'n, 110 S. Ct. 3177 (1990). 
110. Burford, 835 F.2d at 312; see also Wilderness Soc'y v. Griles, 824 F.2d 4, 16 (D.C. 
Cir. 1987). 
111. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 731-41 ( 1972); see also Schlesinger v. Reservists 
Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974) (requiring that a litigant individualize the "injury 
in fact" requirement). 
112. See United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 
412 U.S. 669 (1973); see also supra note 7. 
113. SCRAP, 412 U.S. at 688-89. 
114. See id. at 689; see also Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 
45 (1976) (dealing with several organizations representing the poor and attacking Internal Reve-
nue rules reducing the amount of free medical care hospitals must donate to the poor). 
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the Court failed to state the precise degree of specificity a party must 
provide. This lack of specific guidance regarding the degree of specific-
ity a party must allege and prove creates ambiguity which not only 
contributed to the extensive litigation in Lujan but will likely result in 
similar litigation in the future. 
B. Proposed Establishment of a Uniform Standing Requirement 
1. The general requirements to establish standing 
In view of the uncertainty regarding the standing requirements as 
presently interpreted by the Court, this note proposes a solution. The 
proposal is comprised of both established precedent relating to repre-
sentational standing to contest administrative action and part of a pro-
posal by Judge Williams of the D.C. Circuit in his concurring opinion 
in Burford. 1111 The general representational standing principles from 
Hunt provide the starting point. 116 The Court in Hunt stated these 
principles as follows: "(a) that its members would otherwise have 
standing to sue in their own right; (b) the interests it seeks to protect 
are germane to the organization's purpose; and (c) neither the claim 
asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual 
members in the lawsuit."117 The Hunt test should provide general 
guidance for litigants at the initiation of the proceedings to determine in 
some broad sense whether or not they will be able to establish standing. 
2. judicial limitation for representational standing 
The limitation on representational standing imposed by the Sierra 
and the Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War118 deci-
sions should also be retained. In other words, organizations should be 
required to demonstrate that "the challenged action [h)as caused [its 
members] injury in fact." 119 The D.C. Circuit in Burford demon-
strated the type of injury which a plaintiff must allege to obtain stand-
ing by stating that "(the party asserting standing) must allege facts 
demonstrating a definable and discernible injury to its members."120 
The injury, therefore, must be individualized, and the Court should 
continue to deny standing where a litigant alleges general injuries suf-
fered by the public at large. 
115. Burford, 835 F.2d at 327 (Williams, J., concurring). 
116. See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text. 
117. Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977). 
118. 418 U.S. 208 (1974). 
119. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 733 (1972) (emphasis added). 
120. Burford, 835 F.2d at 311 (citing United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory 
Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669, 688-89 (1973)). 
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3. The specificity to which allegations should adhere 
The degree of specificity necessary for a party to establish standing 
and avoid premature disposal of its action was best addressed by Judge 
Williams of the D.C. Circuit in his concurrence in Burford. 121 Judge 
Williams' opinion provided that to demonstrate the requisite specificity 
for standing, a party would have to "(1) identify lands that are affected 
by each program, (2) demonstrate that third parties are likely to re-
spond to the regulatory changes with development activities, and (3) 
identify activities of members in specific areas that would suffer an ad-
verse impact from such third-party conduct."122 
Adopting Judge William's three requirements would expressly re-
quire litigants to identify not only the injury but also some type of a 
causal nexus between the agency action and the specific injury suffered. 
This requirement will undoubtedly be met with opposition by litigants 
claiming that they are required to prove their case before a trial on the 
merits. The preceding requirements should not be viewed this strictly; 
the "William's requirements" should merely be understood to require 
parties to form their complaints with greater caution, thus providing 
greater predictability in the area of representational standing. 
4. Benefits from adopting the proposed standing approach 
The Constitution generally limits the federal courts to hearing and 
deciding only "cases or controversies."123 The approach proposed in 
this note will aid in sharpening the issues in order to avoid the substan-
tial ambiguity relating to the "standing" issue. In addition, it will pre-
vent courts from summarily dismissing cases which present politically 
sensitive issues if the litigants have met the requirements of litigation. 
Finally, it will present cases where standing is recognized to be proper, 
thus avoiding waste of valuable judicial resources for burdensome 
standing determinations. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this note is not to point out that the federal courts 
entered an incorrect decision in Lujan v. National Wildlife Federa-
tion. The intent, rather, is to illustrate that the courts missed an oppor-
tunity to establish more certain parameters for representational stand-
121. See Burford, 835 F.2d at 327 (Williams, J., concurring). 
122. /d. at 327-28 (emphasis added) (citing Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 733 
(1972); United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 
669, 688-89 (1973); Wilderness Soc'y v. Griles, 824 F.2d 4, 10-12 (D.C. Cir. 1987)). 
123. See U.S. CoNST. art. III. 
217] LUJAN v. NATIONAL WILDLIFE FEDERATION 233 
ing, an area of the law which presents substantial ambiguity to 
litigants. This ambiguity is the result of differing interpretations of the 
Sierra and SCRAP cases and their progeny. 124 With a more definite 
standard to establish standing, the courts could have heard the entire 
case and decided on firmer guidelines in the politically sensitive area of 
federal land withdrawal and agency review. The proposed alterations 
in determining representational standing should provide guidance to 
help avoid protracted litigation, centering only upon the standing issue 
as evidenced by Lujan and supplying future guidance for courts and 
practitioners. 1211 
Darin T. judd 
124. See supra notes 8-30 and accompanying text. 
125. See supra notes 114-22 and accompanying text. 
